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  1







  By any standard measure, auction theory has been an enormous success.  Even 
after twenty-five years of intensive work, the literature continues to grow at a prodigious, 
even accelerating rate;
3 it has spawned much empirical and experimental research;
4 its 
tentacles have spread into other disciplines; 
5 and auction theorists have been influential 
in the design of mechanisms for the privatization of public assets (such as spectrum 
bands) and for the allocation of electricity and other goods (they have also often served as 
consultants to the bidders in those mechanisms). 
  One explanation for this success is good timing.  Many researchers started 
working seriously on auctions in the late 1970’s and early 1980’s,
6 just when the right 
game-theoretic methods for studying this subject - - games of incomplete information 
(John Harsanyi 1967-68) and perfect equilibrium (Reinhard Selten 1975) - - were 
becoming widely known.  Of course, numerous other fields, e.g., industrial organization, 
benefited from the same symbiosis of technique and application; collectively, they 
resulted in the game theory revolution.  But the study of auctions has had more staying 
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power than many other applications of game theory.  Whereas enthusiasm for theoretical 
industrial organization has cooled somewhat since the heady days of twenty years ago, 
research on auctions, as I have noted, continues apace.  There are, I believe, several 
reasons why auction theory has fared comparatively well. 
 
First, theorists of I.O. and other applied fields labor under the constraint that they 
do not know the games that the players they study (e.g. firms or consumers) are actually 
playing; models are at best approximations of reality.  By contrast, auction theorists 
typically know the rules that their players follow precisely.  If, for example, a high-bid 
auction is the object of study, the theorist knows that (i) the bidders submit nonnegative 
real numbers as sealed bids; (ii) the winner is the bidder submitting the highest bid; and 
(iii) the winner pays his bid (of course, there may still be uncertainty about how the 
buyers behave under these rules).  This precision helps put the auction theorist’s findings 
on a relatively strong footing; it also simplifies the job of the experimentalist or 
empiricist. 
 
Second, auction theory appeals to economists’ “social engineering” instincts.  
Many people go into economics at least in part because they want to improve the world.  
The mechanism design 
7 aspect of auction theory—tinkering with the rules of the game in 
order to achieve a better outcome—helps gratify that urge. No doubt, one reason why 
William Vickrey’s work is so celebrated is that his famous creation, the Vickrey auction, 
                                                 
7 Of course, auction theory is only a small part of a vast mechanism design/implementation theory, 
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provides an attractive solution to an important social problem: designing an efficient 
allocation mechanism. 
Third, the basic transaction of an auction—the transfer of a good from seller to 
buyer in exchange for a monetary payment—is, fundamental to all of economics, and so 
auction theory has been nourished by its connection with other theoretical areas.  For 
example, it has sometimes been used as a foundation for understanding the workings of 
competitive markets.
8  Of course, there are important differences: competitive theory 
usually supposes that there are large numbers of buyers and sellers, whereas in most 
auction theory numbers are small (indeed, one implication of the papers of footnote 8, is 
that, as numbers grow, most reasonable sorts of auctions converge in performance; only 
in the small numbers case do the differences between auction forms come into their own). 
 
Finally, auction theory is a genuinely beautiful edifice:
9 many of its major 
propositions deliver remarkably powerful conclusions from apparently modest 
hypotheses. 
 
Despite all these attractions, auctions might have disappeared from the economic 
theory scene had they not received an important rejuvenating boost from the worldwide 
impulse toward privatization that began in the early 1990’s.  This trend was brought on 
by the fall of communism in the East—and the consequent need to sell off state assets—
and the disenchantment with public ownership in the West.  But state bureaucracy’s loss 
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proved to be auction theory’s gain, as auction mechanisms, to considerable public 
acclaim, were increasingly invoked to implement the transfer of resources.  More 
recently, online auction enterprises such as eBay have provided further impetus for the 
theory. 
 
2. Milgrom’s Unified View 
Paul Milgrom has played a starring role in auction theory’s success story.  Not 
only has he been a seminal contributor to the theoretical literature (e.g., Milgrom 1981 
and Milgrom and Robert Weber 1982), but together with Robert Wilson, he had a major 
hand in designing the simultaneous ascending auction format used by the Federal 
Communication Commission to sell off much of the radio spectrum in the United States.  
Thus, his book Putting Auction Theory To Work has been eagerly awaited since his 1995 
Churchill lectures, on which it is based. 
 
The wait has clearly been worth it.  The book covers a great deal of theoretical 
material and does so with extraordinary economy (without sacrificing rigor).  This 
economy derives from Milgrom’s conception of auction theory as a subspecies of 
demand theory, in which a few key tools—the envelope theorem in particular—do most 
of the work.  Indeed, once these tools are in place, he establishes most theorems with just 
a few lines of proof.  As the title suggests, he also discusses the extent to which the 
results bear on the design of real auctions. 
   5
Admittedly, the monograph is not the only current volume of reflections by a 
leading auction expert on theory and practice.
10  Nor, despite its unfailing clarity, is it the 
most likely candidate for a graduate text on the subject.
11  Rather, its signal contribution 
is to lay out Milgrom’s unified view of the theory.  This vision is notably distinct from 
that of other major auction scholars.  He must, for example, be nearly alone in 
deliberately avoiding the revelation principle as a auction-theoretic technique.  But we 
quickly learn to enjoy seeing things his way.  In this sense, the book is more a 
“masterclass” (to quote Al Roth’s blurb on the back cover) than a text.  And, of course, a 
masterclass is more fun. 
 
As for his ideas on how to apply (or not to apply) the theory to actual auctions, 
these are certainly most welcome and enlightening.  But, as they sometimes depend as 
much on judgment (albeit very well informed judgment) as logic, they occasionally 
contrast jarringly with the authority and precision of the theory.  For example, in 
Milgrom’s opinion, the Vickrey auction (more precisely, its multigood generalization due 
to Theodore Groves 1973 and Edward Clarke 1971) is “unsuitable for most applications” 
- - a conclusion that is far from being a theorem and that I will come back to in section 7. 
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  But putting such quibbles aside, I should emphasize that Milgrom is 
completely persuasive on the general point that auction theory matters in practice.  In 
chapter one, he shows that the 1990 New Zealand spectrum auction’s failure to raise the 
revenue anticipated can be traced to its seriously flawed design: separate simultaneous 
sealed-bid auctions for each license.  Specifically, he points out why this auction form 
cannot properly accommodate substitutability or complementarity across licenses.  And 
he responds to those who argue that how government assets are sold off is irrelevant for 
efficiency (because, in their view, the “market” will correct any misallocation afterwards) 
with the theoretical riposte that, under incomplete information, there exists no 
nonconfiscatory mechanism (market-based or otherwise) capable of attaining efficiency, 
once the assets are in private hands (see Proposition 5 below). 
The heart of chapters 2-8 consists of a succession of formal results, almost all 
proved in detail.  I will try to reinforce the book’s important lesson that auction theorems 
are easy to prove by stating and proving some of them below (although I will not attempt 
to replicate Milgrom’s rigor or generality). 
 
3. Vickrey Auctions 
  In chapter two, Milgrom turns to the most famous example of modern auction 
design, the Vickrey (or “second-price”) auction (and its Groves-Clarke extension).  
Suppose that there is one unit of an indivisible good for sale.  There are n potential 
buyers, indexed by i = 1,…, n, and each buyer i has a valuation  i v  for the good (the most 
he is willing to pay for it).  Thus if he pays p, his net payoff is  
      i vp − .   7
 An  auction is a game in which (i) buyers make “bids” for the good (for now we 
will be permissive about what a bid can be), on the basis of which (ii) the good is 
allocated to (at most) one of the buyers, and (iii) buyers make payments (which can in 
principle be negative) to the seller. An auction is efficient if, in equilibrium (we need not 
worry about the precise concept of equilibrium at this point), the winner is the buyer i 
with the highest valuation.
12 
 
  Vickrey discovered that efficiency is attained by a second-price auction: an 
auction in which buyers submit nonnegative numbers as bids, the winner is the high 
bidder (ties can be broken randomly), and the winner pays the second-highest bid 
(nobody else pays anything).  Formally, we have 
Proposition 1 (Vickrey 1961, Theorem 2.1 in Milgrom 2004): In a second-price auction, 
it is (weakly) dominant for each buyer i to bid his valuation  i v  (i.e., regardless of how 
other buyers bid, it is optimal for buyer i to set a bid of  ii bv = ).  Furthermore, the auction 
is efficient. 
Proof: Suppose that buyer i bids  ii bv < .  The only circumstance in which the outcome for 
i is changed by his bidding  i b  rather than  i v  is when the highest bid b by other bidders 
satisfies 
      ii vb b >>. 
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In that event, buyer i loses by bidding  i b  (for which his net payoff is 0) but wins by 
bidding  i v  (for which his net payoff is  i vb − ).  Thus, he is worse off bidding  ii bv < .  By 
symmetric argument, he can only be worse off bidding  ii bv > .  We conclude that bidding 
his valuation (truthful bidding) is weakly dominant.  Because it is optimal for buyers to 
bid truthfully and the high bidder wins, the second-price auction is efficient. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
  The key to the second-price auction’s dominant-strategy property is the fact that a 
winning buyer’s payment does not depend on his bid.  Next, we show that, under mild 
hypotheses, the second-price auction is the only efficient auction with this property 
(modulo adding a term not depending on  i b  to buyer i’s payment): 
Proposition 2 (Jerry Green and Jean–Jacques Laffont 1977, Bengt Holmstrom 1979, 
Laffont and Maskin 1980, Milgrom’s Theorem 2.3): Suppose that, for all i,  i v  can 
assume any value in [0, 1].  Then an auction is efficient and bidding truthfully is weakly 
dominant if and only if (a) the high bidder wins and (b) for all i, buyer i’s payment  i p  
satisfies 
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for some function  i t , where  i b−  is the vector of bids other than  i b .   9
Proof: Consider an efficient auction in which truthful bidding is dominant.  Then, the 
high bidder must win (property (a)).  As for (b), let  ( ) ,
L
iii tb b −  be buyer i’s payment if he 
loses and the bids are () , ii bb − .  If 
( ) ( ) ,,
LL
iii iii tb b tb b −− ′′ ′ >  
for bids  ,m a x ii j ji
bb b
≠
′′ ′ ≤ , then buyer i is better off bidding  i b′′when  ii vb ′ = , contradicting 
the dominant-strategy property.  Hence, we can write  ( ) ,
L
iii tb b −  as 
(1)      ( ) ( ) ,
L
iii ii tb b t b − − = . 
Similarly, we can write buyer i’s payment  ( ) ,
W
ii i tb b −  if he wins as 
(2)      ( ) ( ) ˆ ,
W
ii i ii tb b t b − − = . 
Now, if  max ij ji
vb
≠
= , buyer i’s winning or losing are both efficient, and so for truthful 
bidding to be dominant, buyer i must be indifferent between them.  From (1) and (2), we 
have 
     ( ) ( ) ˆ max ji i i i jibt b t b − − ≠ −= − . 
Hence, 
     () ( ) ˆ max ii j ii ji tb b tb −− ≠ =+ , 
i.e., (b) holds.  Conversely, if (a) and (b) hold, it is immediate that the auction is efficient 
and, from Proposition 1, that truthful bidding is dominant. 
  Q.E.D. 
   10
  Call the auctions of Proposition 2 “generalized Vickrey” auctions.  It is easy to 
see that there is no generalized Vickrey auction in which payments “balance,” i.e., sum to 
zero. 
Proposition 3 (Green and Laffont 1977, Laffont and Maskin 1980, Milgrom’s Theorem 
2.2): Under the hypotheses of Proposition 2 there exists no generalized Vickrey auction 








≡ ∑ . 
Proof: For convenience assume n = 2. Consider a generalized Vickrey auction.  Choose 
12 vv > .  From Proposition 2  
(3)      ( ) ( ) 122 1 22 1 p pvt v t v += + + . 
If the right-hand side of (3) equals zero for all  2 v , then  
(4)      () 12 2 1 tv v k = −+,  
where  1 k  is a constant.  Similarly, for  21 vv > , we obtain 
(5)      () 21 1 2 tv v k = −+, 
for constant  2 k .  From (4) and (5), we can rewrite (3) as  
     121 2 1 p pkkv + =+−, 
which clearly cannot equal zero for all  1 v .  Hence, balanced payments are impossible. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
  As Claude d’Aspremont and Louis-André Gérard-Varet (1979) show, the failure 
of balance in Proposition 3 can be overcome by relaxing the solution concept from 
dominant-strategy to Bayesian equilibrium:   11
Proposition 4 (d’Aspremont and Gérard-Varet 1979) : Suppose that, for all i,  i v  is drawn 
independently from a distribution with c.d.f.  i F  and support [0, 1].  Then there exists an 
efficient and payment-balanced auction in which bidding truthfully constitutes a Bayesian 
equilibrium. 
Proof: For convenience, assume n = 2. In an auction where the high bidder wins and 
buyer 1 pays  () 11 Pb if he bids  1 b , buyer 1 will choose  1 b  to maximize 




vd F x P b − ∫ , 
if buyer 2 bids truthfully.  The first-order condition for this maximization is  
     ( ) ( ) 12 1 1 1 bF b P b ′ ′ = . 
Thus if we set 




Pb x F xd x ′ =∫ , 
buyer 1’s best reply to 2 is to bid truthfully (because the first-order condition holds at 
11 bv = , and so does the second-order condition:  ( ) 21 0 Fv ′ > ).  Similarly, truthtelling is a 
best reply for buyer 2 if his payment function is 




Pb x Fxd x ′ =∫ . 
Now take as payment functions 
    
( ) ( ) ( )





p bb Pb Pb




Then it is evident that the players’ payments sum to zero and that truthtelling remains an 
equilibrium (the latter follows because subtracting  ( ) 22 Pb from buyer 1’s payment does 
not affect his incentives and similarly for buyer 2).   12
  Q.E.D. 
 
  Although balanced payments are consistent with efficiency once we relax the 
solution concept, we cannot also require individual rationality if one of the players 
already owns the good.  More specifically, let us stay with n = 2 and suppose that player 
1 owns the good.  As usual, an efficient mechanism will transfer the good to player 2 if 
and only if  21 vv > .  Thus, in a balanced-payment and efficient mechanism, individual 
rationality for player 1 (the “seller”) is the requirement that 
(6)  () () () () ()
21
11
211 22 22 122 1 2 1 0 , 0 for all   (since  )
vv p b v b v dF v v dF v v p p
= − ≥= − ∫∫ , 
whereas individual rationality for player 2 (the “buyer”) is the condition 




211 211 22 11 2 00 , 0 for all 
v
v v d Fv pbv bv d Fv v
= −≥ ∫∫ , 
where  () 11 bv and  () 22 bv are the (Bayesian) equilibrium bids by players 1 and 2 when 
their valuations are  1 v  and  2 v  respectively. 
Proposition 5 (Laffont and Maskin 1979, Roger Myerson and Mark Satterthwaite 1983, 
Milgrom’s Theorem 3.6 ): Let n = 2.  Under the hypotheses of Proposition 4, there exists 
no efficient and payment-balanced mechanism that is individually rational for both 
players when Bayesian equilibrium is the solution concept. 
Proof: The proof is considerably simplified by supposing that  1 F  and  2 F  are uniform 
distributions on [0, 1].  Consider a balanced-payment and efficient mechanism for which 
() () () 12 , bb ⋅⋅  is a Bayesian equilibrium.  Let 
    () () () ()
1
11 211 22 2 0
ˆ , Pv p bv b v d v =∫  
  a n d    13
    () () () ()
1
22 211 22 2 0 , Pv pbv bv d v =∫ , 
where  () () () 211 22 , p bv bv  is buyer 2’s equilibrium payment when valuations are () 12 , vv .  
Hence, in equilibrium, player 1’s and 2’s maximization problems are respectively 
    ()
1 1
1
11 12 ˆ ˆ
ˆ ˆ max
v v Pv v d v −∫  
  a n d  




21 22 0 ˆ
ˆ max
v
v vd v P v − ∫ . 
In Bayesian equilibrium,  11 ˆ vv =  and  22 ˆ vv = , and so we obtain first-order conditions 
    () 11 1 ˆ 0 Pv v ′ +=  
and 
    () 22 20 vP v ′ −= . 
We conclude that  






Pv k =− +  
and 





Pv k =+ . 
From (6) and (8) when  1 1 v = , we obtain 
(10)     1
1
2
k ≥ , 
and from (7) and (9) when  2 0 v = , we have 
(11)     2 0 k ≤ .   14
By definition of  1 ˆ P  and  2 P , 
  () ()
11
11 1 22 2 00
ˆ P v dv P v dv = ∫∫ . 




kk −= +, 
which contradicts (10) and (11). 
  Notice the striking contrast between Propositions 1 and 4 on the one hand (which 
exhibit efficient auctions) and Proposition 5 on the other (which denies the existence of 
such a mechanism).  The reason for the difference lies in the issue of ownership.  In the 
former two propositions, no player yet owns the good.  We can interpret the latter 
proposition, however, as applying to the circumstance in which there has already been an 
auction that player 1 won—so that he now has the opportunity to resell.  Together, these 
two sets of propositions validate Milgrom’s refutation of the claim that auctions are 
unnecessary for efficiency, that ex post free trade among the players will ensure the right 
allocation.  According to this claim we might just as well assign assets like spectrum 
licenses randomly; firms can always exchange them later to correct misallocations.  But 
Proposition 5 demonstrates that once the licenses have been distributed, efficiency may 
no longer be attainable. 
  Q.E.D. 
4. Auction Equivalences 
  A major achievement of auction theory is to have established equivalences 
between very different auction forms.  Milgrom presents his view of this material in   15
chapters 3 and 4.  The central result is what he calls the payoff-equivalence theorem 
(which implies the considerably weaker but more familiar revenue-equivalence theorem): 
Proposition 6 (Vickrey 1961, Myerson 1981, John Riley and William Samuelson 1981, 
Milgrom’s Theorem 3.3): Under the hypotheses of Proposition 4, if there are two 
auctions such that, in Bayesian equilibrium, (a) for all i and  i v , the probability of winning 
for a buyer i with valuation  i v  is the same in both auctions, and (b) for all i, the amount 
that buyer i with valuation 0  pays is the same in both auctions, then, for all i and  i v , the 
equilibrium expected payoff for buyer i with valuation  i v  is the same in both auctions. 
Proof: Choose one of the two auctions and let  ( ) ( ) ( ) 11 ,, nn bv bv …  be Bayesian 
equilibrium bids by the buyers when valuations are ( ) 1,, n vv … .  Because buyer i has the 
option of behaving as though his valuation is  ˆi v  when in fact it is  i v , he, in effect, faces 
the maximization problem 





Gvv Pv ⎡⎤ − ⎣⎦ , 
where 
   () ˆ  buyer  's probability of winning ii Gv i =  
and 
   () ˆ  buyer  's expected payment ii Pv i =  
if he bids  () ˆ ii bv and each of the other buyers j bids according to the equilibrium bid 
function  () j b ⋅ .  By definition of equilibrium, the maximizing choice of  ˆi v  in (12) is 
ˆii vv = , and so we obtain first-order condition    16
(13)   () () for all  ii iii Pv Gvv i ′′ = . 
Integrating (13), we have 
(14)   () () ()
0
i v
ii i ii i i Pv v Gv G xd x k =− + ∫ , 
where  i k  is a constant of integration.  Notice from (14) that buyer i’s expected payment if 
0 i v =  is  i k .  By hypothesis (b), this is true of the other auction as well.  Furthermore, by 
hypothesis (a), i’s probability of winning in the other auction is  ( ) ii Gv for all  i v .  Hence, 
from (14), buyer i’s expected payment is  ( ) ii Pv  and his net expected payoff is 
() () iii ii Gvv Pv −  in both auctions. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
  Clearly, the function  () i G ⋅  must be lie between 0 and 1, but there are other 
restrictions on it as well.  In particular, it must be nondecreasing. 
Proposition 7 (Myerson 1981, Riley and Samuelson 1981, Milgrom’s Theorem 4.1): In 
any Bayesian equilibrium a buyer’s probability of winning is a nondecreasing function of 
his valuation. 
Proof: From (12) and (13), the derivative of buyer i’s equilibrium expected payoff if his 
valuation is  i v  but he bids as though it were  ˆi v  is 
(15)   () ( ) ˆˆ iii Gv v v ′ − . 
But if  ()0 i Gv ′ <  for some  i v  then from (15) the second-order condition for a maximum 
() () 0 i Gv ′ ≥  is violated at  ˆii vv = , a contradiction. 
  Q.E.D.   17
 
 Notice  that 
(16)   () () ii ji ji Gv Fv
≠ =×  
in the second-price auction because, from Proposition 1, buyers bid truthfully, and so a 
buyer’s probability of winning is simply the probability that the other buyers all have 
lower valuations (the right-hand side of (16)).  Furthermore, 
(17)   () 00 i P =  
in that auction.  But (16) and (17) also hold for the English auction, the mechanism in 
which buyers call out bids openly, each successive bid must be higher than the previous 
one, and the winner is the last buyer to bid (and pays his bid).  To see this, notice that a 
buyer will continue to bid higher in the English auction until the current price reaches his 
valuation, and so the high-valuation buyer will win, i.e., (16) holds.  We have: 
Proposition 8 (Vickrey 1961): The second-price and English auctions are payoff-
equivalent. 
  Remarkably, in the case of ex ante buyer symmetry, i.e., where  1 n FF == … , all 
the “standard” auctions are equivalent: 
Proposition 9 (Vickrey 1961, Riley and Samuelson 1981, Myerson 1981, Milgrom’s 
Theorems 4.6 and 4.9): When each  i v  is drawn independently from a distribution with 
c.d.f. F and support [0, 1], then the high-bid, second-price, English, Dutch and all-pay 
auctions are payoff-equivalent. 
Proof: We have already described the rules of all but the Dutch and all-pay auctions.  In 
the Dutch auction, the auctioneer continuously lowers the price, starting from some high 
level, until some buyer (the winner) agrees to buy at the current price.  Notice that this is   18
formally the same as the high-bid auction, since the price at which a buyer agrees to buy 
in the Dutch auction is the same as the bid he would make in the high-bid auction.
13  In 
the all-pay auction, buyers submit sealed bids and the winner is the high bidder, but 
everybody pays his bid. 
  Consider a symmetric equilibrium  ( ) b ⋅ of the high-bid auction; i.e.  () bv is the bid 
any buyer with valuation v makes (a symmetric equilibrium exists because of the ex ante 
symmetry of the buyers).  From Proposition 7,  ( ) b ⋅  must be nondecreasing.  Suppose it is 
not strictly increasing, i.e., suppose  ( )  for all  , bv b v v v
∗ ∗∗ ∗ ⎡ ⎤ =∈ ⎣ ⎦.  We have  0 vb
∗∗ −≥  
because, thanks to the atom at b
∗, a bid of b
∗ wins with positive probability (and thus if 
0 vb
∗∗ −< , the buyer would have a negative payoff).  Hence we obtain 
(18)   0 vb
∗∗ ∗ −> . 
But if a buyer with reservation price  bids  vb
∗∗∗ , he ties for the high bid with positive 
probability.  Thus if he slightly increases his bid, he discontinuously raises his chances of 
winning (since ties now have zero probability), which is worthwhile in view of (18).  We 
conclude that  () b ⋅  must be strictly increasing, which means that the high-valuation buyer 
always wins.  Thus, Proposition 6 implies that the high-bid auction is equivalent to the 
second-price auction.  This same argument applies to the all-pay auction. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
  We next examine how the auctions of Proposition 9 can be modified to maximize 
the seller’s revenue: 
                                                 
13 This equivalence relies on the assumption that buyers obey the usual axioms of expected utility; see 
Nakajima (2004).   19
Proposition 10 (Riley and Samuelson 1981 and Myerson 1981, and Milgrom’s Theorem 
3.9): Assume the hypotheses of Proposition 9 and suppose that 
(19)   () 0 Jv ′ >  for all v, 








.  Then any of the auctions of Proposition 9 maximizes the 
seller’s expected revenue provided that the seller sets a reserve price v
∗ (i.e., he refuses 
to sell for less than v
∗), where  ( ) 0 Jv
∗ = . 
Proof: Given buyers’ ex ante symmetry, (14) implies that, for any symmetric auction (we 
restrict to symmetric auctions without loss of generality), the seller’s expected revenue is  




nv G v G x d x k d F v ⎡⎤ −+ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ∫∫ , 
which can be rewritten as  
(20)   () () ()
1
0 nJ v G v d F v k + ∫ . 
We have already noted that  () Gv must satisfy  ( ) 0 Gv ′ ≥  and 
(21)   () 01 Gv ≤≤ . 
As Matthews (1984) shows, it must also satisfy  
(22)   () () () ()
1 1
0 for all 
n
v Fx Gxd Fx v
− ⎡⎤ −≥ ⎢⎥ ⎣⎦ ∫ . 
Consider the problem of maximizing (20) subject to (21) and (22).  Note from (12) and 
(14) that  0 k ≤ , otherwise a buyer with zero valuation has a negative expected payoff (an 
impossibility, since he always has the option of not participating).  Hence the maximizing 
choice of k is 0, i.e., 
(23)   () 0  payment by a 0-valuation buyer 0 P == .   20
From (19)-(22), the optimal choice of  ( ) Gv is 
(24)   ()
() ()
1
, if  







⎧ > ⎪ = ⎨
≤ ⎪ ⎩
 
where  ()0 Jv
∗ = .  But all of the auctions of Proposition 9, modified by a reserve price of 
v
∗, satisfy (23) and (24), and so they are solutions to the seller’s problem.
14 
  Q.E.D. 
  The fact that the Dutch and high-bid auctions are equivalent is obvious from the 
identical strategic structure of the two forms.  Nor is the equivalence (Proposition 8) 
between the English auction and the second-price auction very deep.  But the sense in 
which all four auctions are equivalent (Proposition 9) is more interesting, as is the idea 
that any of them—modified by setting a reserve price
15—can be used to maximize the 
seller’s revenue (Proposition 10). 
5. Departures from the Benchmark Model 
  This deeper equivalence, however, relies on some restrictive hypotheses, viz., (i) 
buyers’ risk neutrality, (ii) private values (to be defined below), (iii) independent 
valuations, (iv) ex ante symmetry, and (v) financially unconstrained buyers.
16  We will 
now relax each of (i)-(iii) in turn (for relaxation of (iv), see Milgrom’s Theorems 4.24-
4.27 and Maskin and Riley 2000; for relaxation of (v), see Milgrom’s Theorem 4.17 and 
Che and Gale 1998). 
                                                 
14 We have ignored the constraint  0 G′≥  because it is satisfied by the solution to the program in which it 
is omitted. 
15 The reason why a reserve price helps the seller is that it puts a lower bound on what buyers pay.  Of 
course, by setting a positive reserve, the seller runs the risk of not selling at all, but this effect is outweighed 
by the lower bound consideration.  To see this, imagine that there were just one buyer.  Then in a high-bid 
auction, that buyer would bid zero; the only way to get him to pay anything is to make the reserve positive. 
16 Even, the efficiency of the second-price auction (Proposition 1) invokes (ii), as we will see in Proposition 
12, although it does not demand (i) or (iii).   21
  Note first that in Propositions 6-10, we suppose that buyer i’s objective function is 
given by (12), i.e., that he is risk neutral.  If we replace risk neutrality with risk aversion, 
then in particular Proposition 9 no longer holds 
Proposition 11 (Holt 1980, Maskin and Riley 1984, Matthews 1983, Milgrom’s Theorem 
4.12): Assume that buyers are risk averse; i.e., that buyer i’s utility from winning is 
() ii i uv p − , where  i u  is strictly concave.  Suppose that buyers are ex ante symmetric, i.e., 
the 's i v  are drawn (independently) from the same distribution with c.d.f. F and support 
[0, 1] and  1 n uu u ===   .  Then the high-bid auction generates higher expected revenue 
than the second-price auction. 
Proof: First, observe that risk aversion does not affect behavior in the second-price 
auction; it is still optimal to bid truthfully.  If  ( ) b ⋅  is a symmetric-equilibrium bid 
function in the high-bid auction, a buyer with valuation v solves 









The first-order condition is therefore 
   ()
12 10
nn Fu b n FF u
−− ′′ ′ −+ − = , 
and so 
(25)   ()




nF v u v b v
bv





Now, if buyers were risk neutral, (25) would become 
   ()








′ = .   22
But from Proposition 9, the high-bid and second-price auctions are payoff-equivalent 
when buyers are risk neutral and ex ante symmetric.  Hence,  ( ) RN bv  is also the expected 
payment by a winning v-valuation buyer in the second-price auction (whether he is risk 
averse or not).  Because  0 u′′ < , 











   () () ( ) ( )  whenever  . RN RN b vbv b vbv ′′ >=  
Because  () () 00 0 RN bb == , we conclude that 
   () ()  for all  0, RN bv b v v >>  
which implies that, for every  0 v > , a buyer pays more in the high-bid than in the second-
price auction. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
  Another important hypothesis in sections 2 and 3 is that buyers actually know 
their valuations (more to the point, that their valuations do not depend on the private 
information of other buyers).  This is called the private values assumption.  Let us now 
relax it to accommodate interdependent values (sometimes called generalized common 
values). Specifically, suppose that each buyer i receives a private signal  i s  and that his 
valuation is a function of all the signals: i.e., his valuation is  ( ) , ii i vss − .  In such a setting, 
the second-price auction will no longer be efficient (Maskin 1992); the problem is that 
because buyers no longer know their valuations, their bids (reflecting their expected   23
valuations) do not guarantee that the high bidder actually has the highest valuation.  
Nevertheless, if the signals are one-dimensional (i.e., scalars) then Crémer and McLean 
(1985) and Maskin (1992) show that there exist mechanisms that ensure efficiency 
(provided that “single crossing” holds, i.e., that buyer i’s signal has a greater marginal 









).  More 
concretely, Dasgupta and Maskin (2000) and Perry and Reny (2001), show that, with 
single crossing, there is a way of extending the second-price auction to accommodate 
contingent bids so that efficiency is restored (in a more limited class of cases, Maskin 
1992 and Krishna 2003 show that the English auction is efficient with one-dimensional 
signals).  However, when signals are multidimensional, then efficiency is no longer 
possible. 
Proposition 12 (Maskin 1992, Jehiel and Moldovanu 2001, Milgrom’s Theorem 3.8): 
Suppose that, for some buyer i,  ( ) 12 , ii i ss s =
17 where 

























then, if Bayesian equilibrium is the solution concept, there exists no efficient auction. 
Proof (sketch): Choose parameter values  and  ii ss ′ ′′  such that  ( )( ) ii ii ss ϕϕ ′ ′′ = .  From (26), 
buyer i’s preferences are identical for   and  ii ii ss ss ′ ′′ = =  and so he must be indifferent 
                                                 
17 For convenience, suppose that all the other signals are one-dimensional.   24
between the outcomes that result from the two cases.  But, from (27), which of 
 or  ii i ss ss ′′ ′ ==  holds will in general lead to different efficient allocations - -e.g., perhaps 
buyer i wins when  ii ss ′ =  and loses when  ii ss ′′ = .  Thus it will be impossible to keep him 
indifferent between the outcomes. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
  Despite this negative result, matters are not as bleak as they may seem, at least in 
the case of single-good auctions.  Specifically, introduce a one-dimensional “reduced” 
signal  i r  for buyer i and, for all  ji ≠ , define 
   () ( ) ( ) () ˆ ,,
i ji i s ji i ii i vr s Evs s s r ϕ −− == , 
i.e.,  ()( ) ˆ , i s   , ji i ji i vr s vs s −−  expected over all those values  i s  such that  () ii i sr ϕ = .  
Because we are back to one-dimensional signals, the extended second-price auction 
mentioned above will be efficient with respect to the “reduced” valuations  () , ii i vr s −  and 
{ } ˆj v  (assuming that the single-crossing property above holds).  That is, the auction is 
efficient subject to the constraint that buyer i behaves the same way for any signal values 
i s  for which  () ii i sr ϕ = , i.e., it is incentive efficient (see Dasgupta and Maskin 2000). 
Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001) show, however, that this “reduction” technique does not 
generalize to more than one good. 
  Finally, let us explore what happens when we drop the assumption of 
independence in Proposition 9:   25
Proposition 13 (Milgrom and Weber 1982, Milgrom’s Theorem 4.21): Suppose that 
2 n = ,
18 and that  12 and  vv  are jointly symmetrically distributed with support [0, 1] and 
affiliated (positively correlated) in the sense that  












where  () 21 Fvv  is the c.d.f. for  2 v  conditional on  1 v .  Then, revenue from the second-
price auction exceeds that from the high-bid auction. 
Proof: The expected payments in the two auctions by buyer 1 with valuation  1 v  are 
(29)   () ()
1
11 2 2 1 0
v S Pv v d F v v =∫  
and 
(30)   () () ( ) 11 1 1 1
H Pv F v v b v = , 
where the superscripts S and H denote second-price and high-bid auctions respectively 
and  () b ⋅  is the symmetric equilibrium bid function in the high-bid auction.  Clearly, 
() () 11 00
SH PP = .  We wish to show that  ( ) ( ) 11 1 1 1 for all  0
SH Pv Pv v >> .  It suffices to 







>  whenever  ( ) ( ) 11 1 1
SH Pv Pv = . 
 Differentiating  (29)  and (30) we obtain 
(31)   () ()
1 1
11 1 1 2 2 2 1 0
1
S v dP
vF v v vd F v v
dv
=+ ∫  
and 
                                                 
18 Milgrom and Weber (1982) generalize this result to  3 n ≥ .   26
   () () () () () ()
1
1 1 11 1 1 11 2 1 1
1
H dP
Fvvbv bv Fvv bv F vv
dv
′ =++, 
where subscripts of F denote partial derivations.  The second equation can be rewritten, 
using buyer 1’s first-order condition, as 
(32)   () () ()
1
1 1 11 1 2 11
1
H dP
vF v v b v F v v
dv
=+ . 
When  () () 11 1 1 ,
HS Pv Pv =  







vd F v v
bv
Fvv
= ∫ . 
From (31)-(33), it remains to show that 








v vd F v v d vF v v




But (34) follows from affiliation, i.e., from (28). 
  Notice that Propositions 11 and 13 pull in opposite directions: the former favors 
the high-bid auction, the latter the second-price auction.  This tension illustrates one of 
Milgrom’s introductory points: that the kind of auction a seller will want to use depends 
heavily on the circumstances. 
  Q.E.D. 
 
6. Theory versus Practice 
  I have already suggested that some of Milgrom’s observations about auctions in 
practice are less compelling than the book’s theoretical results.  But this contrast is not 
primarily his fault.  In spite of all that it has accomplished, auction theory still has not   27
developed far enough to be directly applicable to situations as complex as, say, the 
spectrum auctions. 
  To begin with, those auctions involve multiple goods.  Observe, however, that all 
the results presented above are for single-good auctions.  This is no coincidence; the 
literature on auction theory has overwhelmingly focused on the single-good case.  Apart 
from the efficiency of the multigood second-price auction (the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves 
mechanism - - see section 7) with private values, there are few general results for more 
than one good.  The auction designer can attempt to extrapolate from well-analyzed 
environments (one good) to new circumstances (multiple goods).  But doing so is 
hazardous (see, for example, Perry and Reny 1999). 
  Another difficulty for theory is that real auctions impose constraints that are 
difficult to formalize.  Milgrom notes that prospective bidders and sellers are typically 
nervous about participating in auction mechanisms that seem unfamiliar or complicated.  
But giving a precise meaning to “unfamiliar” or “complicated” is forbiddingly difficult. 
  The upshot is that giving advice on real auction design is, at this stage, far less a 
science than an art.  And the essence of an art is far harder than a science to convey 
convincingly in writing. 
 
7. The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism 
  I have noted that Milgrom voices serious criticisms of the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves 
(VCG) mechanism, the generalization of the second-price auction to multiple goods.  
Indeed, his unhappiness with it has led him to collaborate with Lawrence Ausubel   28
(Ausubel and Milgrom 2002) on an interesting and ingenious alternative mechanism, 
reported on in his chapter eight. 
  The VCG mechanisms works as follows: (i) each buyer makes a bid not just for 
each good but for each combination (or “package”) of goods; (ii) goods are allocated to 
buyers in the way that maximizes the sum of the winning bids (a bid for a package is 
“winning” if the buyer making that bid is allocated the package); (iii) each winning buyer 
i pays an amount equal to the difference between (a) the sum of the bids that would win if 
i were not a participant in the auction and (b) the sum of the other buyers’ (actual) 
winning bids.  Following the line of argument in the proof of Proposition 1, one can show 
that truthful bidding (reporting one’s true valuation for each package) is dominant.  Thus 
the auction results in an efficient allocation (an allocation that maximizes the sum of the 
winning valuations). 
  One frequent objection to the VCG mechanism is that it makes heavy demands on 
both buyers (placing bids on every package can be an onerous task) and the auctioneer 
(computing the winning allocation is a potentially difficult maximization problem).  This, 
however, is not the shortcoming that Milgrom dwells on; in fact, the Ausubel-Milgrom 
paper is subject to the same sort of criticism. 
  Instead, Milgrom worries about the following sort of problem.  Assume that there 
are two goods A and B, and two potential buyers 1 and 2.  Suppose that each buyer wants 
these goods only as a package, i.e., his valuation for A or B alone is zero.  Suppose that 
buyer 1 has a valuation of $100 for A and B together, but that buyer 2 has a package 
valuation of $200.  If the buyers bid truthfully in the VCG mechanism, then buyer 2 will   29
win both A and B (and pay $100, the winning bid were 2 not present).  Buyer 1 will come 
away empty-handed. 
  Suppose, however, that buyer 1 enters bids through two different proxy buyers, 1x 
and 1y.  As buyer 1x, he enters a bid of $201 for good A (and zero for both B and the 
package AB).  As 1y, he enters a bid of $201 for good B (and zero for both A and AB).  
Then 1x and 1y will be the winners of A and B respectively, and so 1 will obtain both 
goods.  Furthermore, notice that had 1x not bid at all, 1y would still be the winner of good 
B (good A would just be thrown away), and so the sum of the other buyers’ winning bids 
is the same (namely, $201) whether 1x participates or not.  Thus, by VCG rules, 1x pays 
nothing at all (and similarly neither does 1y), which means that the ploy of passing 
himself off as multiple buyers is worthwhile for 1.  Unhappily, it generates no revenue 
for the seller and leads to an inefficient allocation (1 wins the goods rather than 2), which 
is why Milgrom is led to reject the VCG auction. 
  But notice that having 1x and 1y enter these bids makes sense for 1 only if he is 
quite sure that buyer 2 does not value A and B as single goods.  As soon as there is a 
serious risk that 2 will make single-good bids that add up to $101 or more, buyer 1 will 
come out behind with this strategy (relative to truthful bidding).  If, for example, buyer 2 
bid $51 for each of A and B alone (as well as $200 for the package), 1x and 1y would 
still be awarded A and B with their $201 bids but buyer 1 (through his proxies) would 
now pay $51 + $51 = $102 for a package worth only $100 to him. 
  Indeed, with sufficient uncertainty about how other buyers will bid, it is not hard 
to see that nothing other than truthful bidding makes sense for a buyer in a VCG auction.  
And since I would venture to say that considerable uncertainty is quite common in real   30
auction settings, I believe that Milgrom is too harsh when he deems VCG “unsuitable” 
for most applications. 
 
8. Concluding Remark 
  Still, this is a minor reservation about a volume that covers a cornucopia of 
material in magisterial fashion and gives us deep insight into the thinking of an 
outstanding theorist.  The book is not for everybody; one needs at least enough technique 
to be able to follow the proofs of the propositions above.  But, with that qualification, I 
warmly commend it to all wishing to experience the beauty and power of this remarkable 
theory.   31
References 
 
Ausubel, Lawrence and Paul Milgrom. 2002. “Ascending Auctions with Package 
Bidding,” Frontiers of Theoretical Economy 1. 
 
Che, Yeon-Koo and Ian Gale. 1998. “Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained 
Bidders,” Review of Economic Studies, 65, pp. 1-21. 
  
Clarke, Edward. 1971. “Multipart Pricing of Public Goods,” Public Choice 11, pp. 17-33. 
 
Crémer, Jacques and Richard McLean. 1985. “Optimal Selling Strategies under 
Uncertainly for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent,” 
Econometrica 53, pp. 345-361. 
 
d’Aspremont, Claude and Louis-André Gérard-Varet.  1979. “Incentives and Incomplete 
Information,”  Journal of Public Economics 11, 24-45. 
 
Dasgupta, Partha and Eric Maskin. 2000. “Efficient Auctions,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 115, pp. 341-388. 
 
Green, Jerry and Jean-Jacques Laffont. 1977. “Characterization of Satisfactory  
Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods,” Econometrica 45, 
pp. 427-438. 
 
Griesmer, James, Richard Levitan, and Martin Shubik. 1967. “Towards a Study of 
Bidding Process Part IV: Games with Unknown Costs,” Naval Research Logistics 
Quarterly 14, pp. 415-433. 
 
Groves, Theodore. 1973. “Incentives in Teams,” Econometrica 61, pp. 617-631. 
 
Harsanyi, John. 1967-68.  “Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ 
Players,” parts 1-3, Management Science 14, pp.159-182, 370-374, 486-502. 
 
Holmstrom, Bengt. 1979. “Groves Schemes on Restricted Domains,” Econometrica 47, 
pp. 1137-1144. 
 
Holt, Charles. 1980. “Competitive Bidding for Contracts under Alternative Auction 
Procedures,” Journal of Political Economy 88, pp. 433-445.  
 
Jehiel, Philippe and Benny Moldovanu. 2001. “Efficient Design with Interdependent 
Valuations,” Econometrica 69, pp. 1237-1259. 
 
Klemperer, Paul. 2004. Auctions: Theory and Practice. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press. 
 
Krishna, Vijay. 2002. Auction Theory. San Diego: Academic Press.   32
 
Krishna, Vijay. 2003. “Asymmetric English Auctions,” Journal of Economic Theory 112, 
pp. 261-268. 
 
Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Eric Maskin. 1979.  “A Differential Approach to Expected 
Utility Maximizing Mechanisms,” in Jean-Jacques Laffont, ed., Aggregation and 
Revelation of Preferences.  Amsterdam:  North-Holland. 
 
Laffont, Jean-Jacques and Eric Maskin. 1980. “A Differentiable Approach to Dominant 
Strategy Mechanisms,” Econometrica 48, pp. 1507-1520. 
 
Maskin, Eric. 1992. “Auctions and Privatization,” in H. Siebert, ed., Privatization: 
Symposium in Honor of Herbert Giersch.  Tubingen: Mohr (Siebek),  pp. 115-136. 
 
Maskin, Eric and John Riley. 1984. “Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers,” 
Econometrica 52, pp. 1473-1518. 
 
Maskin, Eric and John Riley. 2000. “Asymmetric Auctions,” Review of Economic 
Studies, 67, pp. 413-438. 
 
Maskin, Eric and Tomas Sjöström.  2002.  “Implementation Theory,” in Kenneth Arrow, 
Amartya Sen, and Kataro Suzumara, eds., Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, 
vol. I.  New York:  Elsevier Science, 237-288. 
  
Matthews, Steven. 1983. “Selling to Risk Averse Buyers with Unobservable Tastes,” 
Journal of Economic Theory 3, pp. 370-400. 
 
Matthews, Steven. 1984.  “On the Implementability of Reduced Form Auctions,” 
Econometrica 52, pp. 1519-1522. 
 
Milgrom, Paul. 1981. “Rational Expectations, Information Acquisition, and Competitive 
Equilibrium,” Econometrica 49, pp. 921-943. 
 
Milgrom, Paul. 2004. Putting Auction Theory to Work. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Milgrom, Paul and Robert Weber. 1982. “A Theory of Auctions and Competitive 
Bidding,” Econometrica 50, pp. 443-459. 
 
Myerson, Roger. 1981. “Optimal Auction Design,” Mathematics of Operations Research 
6, pp. 58-73. 
 
Myerson, Roger and Mark Satterthwaite. 1983. “Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral 
Trade,” Journal of Economic Theory 29, pp. 265-281. 
   33
Nakajima, Daisuke.  2004.  “The First-Price and Dutch Auctions with Allais-Paradox 
Bidders,”  Princeton University, mimeo. 
 
Ortega Reichert, Armando. 1968. “A Sequential Game with Information Flow,” 
Technical Report No. 8, Department of Operations Research, Stanford University. 
 
Palfrey, Thomas.  2002.  “Implementation Theory,” in Robert Aumann and Sergiu Hart, 
eds., Handbook of Game Theory with Economic Applications, vol. III.  New York:  
Elsevier Science, pp. 2271-2326. 
 
Perry, Motty and Philip Reny. 1999. “On the Failure of the Linkage Principle,” 
Econometrica 67, pp. 895-900. 
 
Perry, Motty and Philip Reny. 2002. “An Efficient Auction,” Econometrica 70, pp. 1199-
1212. 
 
Pesendorfer, Wolfgang and Jeroen Swinkels. 1997. “The Loser’s Curse and Information 
Aggregation in Common Value Auctions,” Econometrica 68, pp. 135-148. 
 
Riley, John and William Samuelson. 1981. “Optimal Auctions,” American Economic 
Review 71, pp. 381-392. 
 
Satterthwaite, Mark and Steven Williams. 1989. “The Rate of Convergence to Efficiency 
in the Buyer’s Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large,” Review of 
Economic Studies 56. pp. 477-498. 
 
Selten, Reinhard. 1975. “Reexamination of the Perfectness for Equilibrium Points in 
Extensive Games,” International Journal of Game Theory 4, pp. 25-55. 
 
Serrano, Roberto. 2004. “The Theory of Implementation of Social Choice Rules,” SIAM 
Review 46, 377-414. 
 
Vickrey, William. 1961. “Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed 
Tenders,” Journal of Finance 16, pp. 8-37. 
 
Wilson, Robert. 1969. “Competitive Bidding with Disparate Information,” Management 
Science 15, pp. 446-448. 
 
Wilson, Robert. 1977. “A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition,” Review of Economic 
Studies 44, pp. 511-518. 
 